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INTRODUCTION
Subliminal priming
R������� o� u��o����ou� ��flu����� o� b�����o� ��� b��� 
attracting much interest in recent years because these 
kinds of studies give some insight into what conscious 
awareness is for. Indeed, by comparing what the human 
brain can do without bothering for conscious awareness 
to those situations where conscious mediation is needed, 
we can try to infer the role of the latter process. 
To  make  stimuli  unseen  and  still  effective  on  be�
havior, usually backward masking is used in which a 
AbSTRACT
Masked stimuli (primes) can affect the prepara-
tion  of  a  motor  response  to  subsequently  pre-
sented target stimuli. Reactions to the target can 
be facilitated (straight priming) or inhibited (in-
verse priming) when preceded by a compatible 
prime (calling for the same response) and also 
when preceded by an incompatible prime. Sev-
eral hypotheses are currently under debate.
These are the self-inhibition (SI) hypothesis, 
the object-updating (OU) hypothesis, and mask-
triggered inhibition (MTI) hypothesis. All assume 
that the initial activation of the motor response 
is elicited by the prime according to its identity. 
This activation inevitably leads to straight prim-
ing in some cases and the mechanisms involved 
are undisputed. The hypotheses differ, however, 
as to why inverse priming occurs. The self-inhi-
bition  (SI)  hypothesis  assumes  that  the  motor 
activation elicited by a prime is automatically fol-
lowed by an inhibition phase, leading to inverse 
priming if three conditions are fulfilled: percep-
tual evidence for the prime has to be sufficiently 
strong, it has to be immediately removed by the 
mask, and the delay between the prime and tar-
get has to be long enough for inhibition to become 
effective.  The  object-updating  (OU)  hypothesis 
assumes that inverse priming is triggered by the 
mask, provided that it contains features calling for 
the alternative response (i.e. the one contrasting 
with the response induced by the prime). The MTI 
hypothesis assumes that the inhibitory phase is 
triggered by each successive stimulus which does 
not support the perceptual hypothesis provided 
by the prime. Based mostly on our own experi-
ments, we argue that (1) attempts to manipulate 
the three factors required by the SI hypothesis 
imply  changes  of  other  variables  and  that  (2) 
indeed,  other  variables  seem  to  affect  priming: 
prime-mask  perceptual  interaction  and  tempo-
ral position of the mask. These observations are 
in favor of the MTI hypothesis. A limiting factor 
for all three hypotheses is that inverse priming is 
larger for arrows than for other shapes, making it 
doubtful as to what extent the majority of studies 
on inverse priming, due to their use of arrows, 
can be generalized to other stimuli. 
Advances in Cognitive Psychology
DOI: 10.2478/v10053-008-0024-1182
http://www.ac-psych.org
Piotr Jaśkowski and Rolf Verleger
subsequent stimulus (the mask) is able to reduce vis�
ibility of the preceding stimulus (the prime). With the 
appropriate timing and spatial arrangement of masks 
and primes, this technique works very effectively with a 
��d� ����� o� �t��u��. A �u����t�� ��d�������d ���ot���
sis assumes that the mask disrupts the reentry process 
(an iterative loop comparing sensory input with stored 
representations), which is thought to be necessary for 
creating a vivid percept (Di Lollo & Enns, 2000). 
Even if completely masked, primes have been shown 
to  be  processed  quite  effectively.  Such  processing  has 
been demonstrated by showing that masked stimuli can 
affect  responses  to  or  categorizations  of  a  target  pre�
sented after the prime and mask. This method is called 
subliminal priming. With this method, it was shown that 
primes can affect detection (Fehrer & Raab, 1962), pattern 
recognition (Neumann & Klotz, 1994), recognition of word 
meaning (Draine & Greenwald, 1998), and categorization 
(Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, & 
Riviére, 2001; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). Although it is still 
debatable which level of processing the subliminal primes 
can really affect (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Breitmeyer, 
Ro,  &  Singhal,  2004;  B���t������  Öğ����  R��o��  & 
Chen, 2005; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003), there are 
currently no doubts that people’s behavior may depend 
on sensory information they are unaware of.
Subliminal priming of motor reactions was demon�
�t��t�d �o� t�� fi��t t��� b� F����� ��d R��b (1962). 
They measured simple reaction times (RT) to presenta�
tions of a square. With onset asynchronies ranging from 
0 to 75 ms, two other squares were displayed left and 
right of the original one, masking the priming square by 
metacontrast (Breitmeyer, 1984) and thereby reducing 
its perceived brightness to an extent depending on the 
interval between the prime and mask, with a maximal 
reduction for the onset asynchrony of 75 ms. Because 
o� t�� �������o�� ������� d����d���� b�t���� ������ 
reaction time and brightness (e.g. Bartlett & MacLeod, 
1954; ����o����� 1985; M���fi��d� 1973), Fehrer and 
Raab expected the longest RTs for 75 ms. It turned out, 
however, that RT did not depend on perceived bright�
ness at all. Fehrer and Raab suggested that the primes 
triggered  reactions  before  their  perceived  brightness 
was reduced by the mask (Note 1). 
This effect was further explored by Neumann and 
Klotz (1994; see also Klotz & Neumann, 1999). In one 
of their experiments, two well visible shapes were pre�
���t�d ���t ��d ����t o� fix�t�o�. O�� ����� ��� t�� t���
��t� ��qu����� � ���t o� ����t ��������� d����d��� o� �t� 
������t�t�o� ��d�. T�� ������� fi�u��� ���� ����� ������
cas of those used in the visible pair and were completely 
�����d b� t�� ���� fi�u��� t��ou�� ��t��o�t���t. T�� 
primes were indeed not noticeable, as was checked in a 
separate session. If decision making had relied only on 
conscious recognition of the stimuli, the unseen prime 
should not have affected participants’ RTs. In fact, re�
sponses to the target stimuli were speeded up by com�
patible and delayed by incompatible primes, that is, it 
did matter whether the small copy of the target shape 
in the priming pair was on the same side as in the vis�
ible pair or on the other side to the visible pair. Priming 
with such an outcome will be referred to as “straight 
priming”, following Verleger et al. (V�������� ����o����� 
Aydemir, Van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). 
T���  fi�d���  ���  �������t�d  ��  �u���ou�  �tud��� 
performed in Neumann’s (Ansorge, Klotz, & Neumann, 
1998;  Fellows,  Tabaza,  Heumann,  Klotz,  Neumann, 
Schwarz, Noth, & Töpper, 2002; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; 
Klotz  &  Wolff,  1995)  as  well  as  in  other  laboratories 
(����o����� V�� d�� Lubb�� S���ott��b���� & V�������� 
2002; ����o����� S������� & V�������� 2003; ����o���� 
et al., 2002; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Mattler, 2003).
Direct parameter specification
To �x����� t���� fi�d����� N�u���� ��d K�otz (1994) 
applied Neumann’s (1990) theory of direct parameter 
�����fi��t�o� (��S). A��o�d��� to t�� �o�t �����t �����o� 
of this theory (see Ansorge & Neumann, 2005) the fate 
of the information which, due to masking, did not reach 
the level of consciousness depends on participants’ cur�
rent intentions. They search the environment for infor�
mation that helps to perform the task. For example, in 
the case of choice responses with left and right hands, 
���t  ���  to  b�  �����fi�d  o�  t��  b����  o�  ���o���� 
�t��u�� �� t�� ����o��� ���d. Ot��� ������t��� �ou�d 
�����d� b� �����fi�d b��o�� t�� �t��u�u� ��� ������t�d. 
Therefore, any stimulus that appears is evaluated for 
t�� ������� t�����������t ���o���t�o�. I� � ������� ����� 
Kiesel et al. (Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, this wolume) 
assumed that subliminally presented stimuli can trigger 
����o���� to t�� �xt��t t��� fit �o������d ��t�o� t������� 
(�.�. ��t�o� ������� �o�d�t�o��) ����� ��� �����fi�d o���
line by the demands of a task to be done.  
According to these theories, conscious awareness 
is not necessary to specify the free parameters or to 
compare  the  stimulus  features  with  the  action  trig�
gers. Rather, unconsciously processed information, as 
�� �x�������t� ��t� �ub������� �������� �� �u�fi����t. 
This means that consciousness plays only the role of 
an agent that has to determine what to do, and has to 
control whether everything goes well (����o���� �t ��.� 
2003),  whereas actual task performance is delegated 
to automatic unconscious processes.  Straight and inverse priming
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This view was corroborated by electrophysiological 
data (����o���� �t ��.� 2002; ����o���� �t ��.� 2003; 
Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). Using the original Neumann 
and Klotz paradigm, Leuthold and Kopp (1998) showed 
that  the  negativity  contralateral  to  the  responding 
hand (lateralized readiness potential, LRP), indicating 
selection and execution of the response to the target, 
is preceded by a smaller positive wave in incompatible 
trials  and  by  a  negative  wave  (partially  overlapping 
��t� t�� t����t�����t�d LR�) �� �o���t�b�� t�����. T���� 
����� ����� ���� ��t�����t�d �� ��fl��t�o�� o� ������
related activations automatically elicited according to 
the prime identity and participants’ task. 
Inverse priming
The DPS theory suggests that what is formed consciously 
in a choice task is an intention. Those stimuli encom�
�����d b� t�� ��t��t�o� ��� t��� b� �d��t�fi�d �uto��t��
cally, without mediation of consciousness, and can trigger 
response activation. Therefore, if some prime, visible or 
not, is incompatible with the target, the wrong response 
is initially activated. When the target appears, the ongo�
ing motor activity has to be canceled and replaced by the 
preparation of the alternative response.
 This picture was remarkably complicated by Eimer 
and Schlaghecken’s (1998) fi�d����. ������ t�� ���
jority of studies cited above, Eimer and Schlaghecken 
u��d  ��tt�����������  ��t���  t���  ��t��o�t���t. 
Three shapes – a prime, a mask and a target – were 
�o����ut����� d�������d �t fix�t�o�. T�� ����� ��d t�� 
t����t ���� doub�� ���o�����d�� �o��t��� to t�� ���t 
or to the right. Participants had to respond with their 
left or right hands depending on whether the arrows 
pointed left or right. The mask was formed from the 
two target shapes overlaid on one another. 
The  pattern  of  results  was  different  from  that 
obtained  with  metacontrast  masking:  the  RTs  were 
shorter and more accurate when the priming and tar�
get arrows pointed in different directions (incompatible 
trials) than when they pointed in the same directions. 
Throughout this article we will refer to this phenom�
enon as “inverse priming”. 
The  LRPs  obtained  in  Eimer  and  Schlaghecken’s 
experiment  looked  different  from  those  reported  by 
Leuthold and Kopp (1998). In the case of the com�
��t�b�� t������ t�� ����o��������t�d ����t��� LR� ��� 
�����d�d b� t�o ������� d�fl��t�o��� � ����t��� o�� 
observed around 240 ms after the prime, followed by a 
�o��t��� o�� �t 360 ��. I� t�� ���� o� t�� ���o���t�b�� 
trials, the polarities of the two waves preceding the 
t����t�����t�d ����t���t� ���� �������d: fi��t � �o���
tive wave appeared and then a negative one, which 
o��������d ��t� t�� t����t�����t�d ����t���t�.
SELF-INHIbITION
In  the  light  of  the  theories  at  the  time,  Eimer  and 
Schlaghecken’s  (1998)  outcome  was  unexpected.  To 
account for their results, they proposed that the initial 
��������du��d ��t���t�o� o� �o�� ����o��� �� �������d 
by inhibition. In more detail, when the temporal interval 
between prime and target is short, subliminal primes 
activate responses in accordance with the DPS theory. 
T��� �� b���u�� t�� t����t ������� ����� ��������du��d 
activation still persists. This phase of activation is then 
followed by an inhibitory phase which becomes effective 
if the distance between the mask and target becomes 
long enough. Then, if a target identical or similar to 
the prime appears (compatible trial), the proper hand is 
inhibited, leading to delayed responding. The reversed 
situation occurs with incompatible trials. This idea was 
consistent  also  with  the  observed  LRP:  according  to 
t����  �ut�o���  t��  t�o  �����  �����d���  t��  t����t�
����t�d ����t���t� ��fl��t t�� �x��t�to�� ��d ����b�to�� 
������ o� t�� ��������du��d ����o��� ��t���t�o�.
The effect of spatial and temporal 
variations on priming 
This simple model was shown to successfully account for 
a number of results collected subsequently by Eimer and 
Schlaghecken. First of all, it was shown that the priming 
effect critically depends on the temporal interval between 
the prime and target: straight priming occurred only for 
��o�t  ������t����t  ��t������  �����  �������  �������  ���
peared once the interval was long enough. 
T���  fi�d���  �u����t�d  �  ������t  �o���u����  b��
tween  Eimer  and  Schlaghecken’s  new  priming  ef�
���t  ��d  �������  fi�d����.  I�d��d�  ��  t�o��  �tud���� 
the  primes  were  masked  by  metacontrast,  and  so 
the mask simultaneously used to play the role of the 
t����t.  T�����o���  �o�  ��fi����t  �������  o�  t��  ������ 
t�� ������t����t ��t����� ��d to b� qu�t� ��o�t (�bout   
50 ��). Mo��o���� ������� �� ��o�� to b� �o�� ��fi�
cient when stimuli are presented peripherally. Therefore, 
primes and masks were usually presented left and right of 
fix�t�o�. W�t� t���� �o�d�t�o�� ���� ���o��b�� �o� �t�����t 
priming to occur (see below). To exclude the possibility 
that the differences between Eimer and Schlaghecken’s 
(1998)  and  earlier  results  were  due  to  the  type  of 
masking, Eimer (1999) performed an experiment with 
metacontrast masking and showed that, again, priming 
b����� ������� ���� t�� ������t����t ��t����� ��� �u��
fi����t�� �o��. It ��ou�d� �o������ b� �ot�d t��t �� o�d�� 184
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to ������ �����u��t� t�� ������t����t ��t����� ��t�out 
affecting the prime visibility, a mask had to be inserted 
between the prime and target. Therefore, the stimulat�
ing sequence consisted of three consecutive stimuli, as 
in Eimer and Schlaghecken’s original study.
Prime visibility and strength of 
sensory representation
To account for further results, Schlaghecken and Eimer 
(2002)  had  to  introduce  another  assumption,  namely 
that  an  important  factor  determining  the  sign  of  the 
priming effect is the visibility of the prime. First of all, 
inverse priming had never been noted when the prime 
was left unmasked (Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Verleger et 
al.,  2004).  Moreover,  Eimer  and  Schlaghecken  (2002) 
showed that the priming effect increased from negative 
(inverse priming) to positive values (straight priming) 
����  �������  ��fi������  d�������d.  T��  �����  ���� 
composed of tilted lines of different lengths and orien�
t�t�o��. M��� ��fi������ ��� �����u��t�d b� �������� 
the number of line elements or the prime duration. The 
transition point between inverse and straight priming oc�
curred precisely when d’ started to diverge from zero, 
suggesting  an  important  role  of  the  prime’s  visibility. 
At that time, these authors concluded: “These results 
suggest that the conscious awareness of a prime stimu�
lus and the presence or absence of response inhibition 
[��fl��t���  �������  �������]  ��  �ub�������  �������  ��� 
linked.” (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002, p. 520). However, 
in light of further evidence the claim was dismissed that 
there existed a simple and uniformly effective connection 
between conscious visibility of the prime and straight 
priming on the one hand, and invisibility of the prime and 
inverse priming on the other (see Schlaghecken, Rowley, 
Sembi,  Simmons,  &  Whitcomb,  this  volume;  Sumner, 
this volume; for the reasons see also below).
Strength of sensory representation
In  a  subsequent  series  of  experiments,  Schlaghecken 
and  Eimer  (2002)  manipulated  the  temporal  interval 
b�t���� t�� ����� ��d ���� (����� ������� t�� �����
target  distance  constant),  and  showed  that  for  short 
intervals the priming effect was straight and turned to 
������� �o� �o���� ��t������. To ���ou�t �o� t��� fi�d���� 
they assumed that the extension of the interval gave time 
�o� ���������� t�� ��������o��d ����o�� ��������t�t�o� 
and that this sensory representation had to exceed some 
limit in order to evoke inverse priming. To support their 
view, they conducted another experiment in which the 
����� ��� ������t�d ������t � ���do��dot b�����ou�d 
supposed to degrade the prime and thereby to reduce 
its sensory strength. They expected inverse priming for 
intact primes and straight priming for degraded ones. In 
fact, priming was inverse for the intact prime but was 
remarkably reduced for the degraded masks.
Therefore, the original inhibition hypothesis by Eimer 
and Schlaghecken (1998) needed to be supplemented. 
Schlaghecken  and  Eimer  (Bowman,  Schlaghecken,  & 
Eimer, 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) formulated 
a more elaborated model in which the inhibitory phase 
of the basic mechanism (activation followed by inhibi�
t�o�) ��� t�������d o��� �� t�� ��������o��d ����o�� 
���ut ���� fi��t� �t�o�� ��ou��� ��d ���o�d� ����d��
ately erased by the mask. Therefore, this model can 
be summarized as follows: (1) a prime that resembles 
a target activates the motor response required by the 
t����t�  (2)  t���  ��t���t�o�  ��  �uto��t������  ���������b�
ited provided that the strength of the prime’s sensory 
��������t�t�o� �� �u�fi����t�� ����� to t������ t��� ����b��
to�� ���������� ��d (3) ���������b�t�o� ��� o��� ������� 
when perceptual evidence for the prime is immediately 
removed (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002); (see Note 2). 
This latter feature is responsible for why the sign of 
the priming effect and prime visibility are linked, as is 
�u����t�d b� t�� �bo���quot�d ��t�t�o� ��o� E���� ��d 
Schlaghecken’s (2002) study. In a similar vein, Klapp 
and Hinkley (2002) assumed that under conditions of 
low prime visibility, unconscious processes, which are 
generally inhibitory in nature, win the competition over 
conscious processes, which are excitatory.
O�� ����t �o���d�� t���� ���u��t�o�� to b� �o�t���
dictory because, on the one hand, the prime must be 
strongly perceived, and on the other hand, it must be 
effectively removed from being perceived. In any case, 
these  two  antagonistic  mechanisms  might  account  for 
widely differing patterns of results, and thus these hy�
�ot����� ����t ��o�� d��fi�u�t to �o��ut�. T�� ��tu�t�o� 
�����  qu�t�  �����d�fi��d  ����  t��  tu�����  �o��t  ��o� 
inverse  to  straight  priming  is  strictly  linked  to  vis�
ibility,  as  had  been  done  by  Eimer  and  Schlaghecken 
(2002). In such a case, inverse priming is expected for   
d’ = 0 and straight priming occurs for d’ > 0. Therefore, the 
���ot����� �ou�d ���� to b� �����fi�d o��� ������� �����
ing occurs for visible primes (d’ > 0) or straight priming for   
d’ = 0. Such results have indeed been presented (����o���� 
&  ��z��o������K����z���  2005;  Lleras  &  Enns,  2004; 
Verleger et al., 2004). More recently, however, the linkage 
between inhibition and prime visibility has been relaxed 
by  the  adherents  of  the  SI  hypothesis.  Consequently, 
any refutation of the SI hypothesis becomes extremely 
d��fi�u�t b���u�� ���t���� t�� ���� o� t�� ������� �����t� 
it may be explained by the SI hypothesis by assuming 
that the strength of sensory representation either crossed   Straight and inverse priming
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the inhibition threshold or did not. Indeed, inverse prim�
ing with clearly suprathreshold primes has not been taken 
as an argument against the SI hypothesis (Experiment 1 
of Schlaghecken, Rowley, Sembi, Simmons, & Whitcomb, 
this volume).
However, we showed (����o����� 2007; ����o����� 
B��łuń����  To������  &  V��������  ��  ����s)  that  in�
verse  priming  may  appear  even  if  primes  are  not 
o���ud�d b� t�� ����. R�t��� �t ����t b� �u�fi����t 
that  the  mask  is  not  ignored.  In  one  of  this  series 
of  experiments  (����o����  �t  ��.�  ��  ����s),  arrow 
������ ���� ������t�d 2° �bo�� ��d b��o� fix�t�o�� 
and  arrow  targets  were  presented  2°  left  and  right 
o�  fix�t�o�.  T��  ����  �o����t�d  o�  o������d  ������� 
but t��� “����” ��� ������t�d �t fix�t�o�� ��d t�u� 
d�d �ot ���� t�� ������ �t ���. ������“����”�SOA�   
(SOA  =  �t��u�u�  o���t  �������o��)  ����  25�  75�   
125 �� �� ���do� o�d��� ����� t�� ������t����t�SOA 
was always 205 ms. In a control condition, no mask 
was presented at all. Prime effects were inverse when 
������“����”�SOA ��� 75 ��� �qu�� to z��o �o� ������
“����”�SOA = 125 ��� ��d �t�����t �o� t�� �o����� 
condition.  LRPs  displayed  a  triphasic  shape  for  the 
compatible trials and a biphasic shape for incompat�
ible trials, similar to Eimer and Schlaghecken’s (1998) 
results in the “normal” masking situation. Moreover, a 
����� d����d���� o� LR� o� SOA ��� �ou�d� �u����t�
��� t��t t�� �o���� t�� SOA ���� t�� ��t�� t�� ���o�d 
wave of the triphasic complex appeared (see Fig. 1). In 
our view, this experiment casts serious doubts on the 
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Figure 1. 
Results obtained by Jaśkowski et al. (in press). The primes were two identical double arrows presented above and below fixation. 
They were followed by a distractor being formed from two overlaid arrows and presented at fixation. The targets were also dou-
ble arrows presented to the left and right of fixation. The course of a trial is presented in the upper-right diagram. Thd triangles 
represent possible temporal positions of the distractor. Reaction times are presented in the upper-left graph. LRPs (separately 
for the compatible and incompatible trials) are presented in the lower row. The arrows indicate the positions of a deflection called 
L380, which reflects the (mask-triggered) inhibitory phase.186
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role that is assigned in the SI hypothesis to the mask. 
I�d��d� �� t�� �bo���d�����b�d �x�������t t�� ���� 
did not remove the perceptual evidence for the prime. 
Nevertheless, occurrence of the inhibition phase of the 
LRP is strictly related to the moment of mask pres�
entation. This may be taken to suggest that a more 
critical factor than occlusion from visibility is just the 
presentation of a temporally trailing stimulus at the 
same place or in the nearest vicinity.
PRIME-MASK INTERACTION
Mask structure matters
The size of inverse priming (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
1998) has continuously shrunk over the years, from 
�bout �50 �� �� 1998 (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Ex�������t  1)  ���  �bout  �20  ��  ��  2002  (Eimer  & 
Schlaghecken, 2002) to �bout �10 �� �� �����t ��t��
cles (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006; Experiment 1). Had 
Eimer and Schlaghecken published this small effect in 
1998,  perhaps  neither  we  nor  hardly  anybody  else 
would have cared about it. But since the 1998 paper 
started with  that spectacular effect, several authors 
were attracted by this provocative phenomenon and a 
��u�t�u� �����t�fi� d���u���o� ��� �t��t�d.
Eimer and Schlaghecken’s (1998) approach was 
generalized by Klapp and Hinkley (2002) to encom�
pass the difference between conscious and uncon�
scious processing. These two papers were criticized 
by  Lleras  and  Enns  (2004)  and  Verleger  et  al. 
(2004),  who  underscored  that  the  masks  in  these 
t�o ������ ���� �o��o��d o� t����t����� fi�u���� o� 
at least contained features the participants searched 
�o� �� t�� t����t �t��u�� (Not� 3) to ��o����� ����
form the task. Following this observation, Lleras and 
Enns  (2004)  suggested  that  each  new  stimulus  is 
integrated with an already existing scene and an up�
dated version of that scene is created. If the scene 
has been changed, the old version is replaced by a 
new version. When the new elements of the scene 
call for the other behavior than that already initiated 
by  the  prime,  participants  change  their  behavior 
accordingly. This means that if elements are found 
����� ���� �o� ��ot��� ����o���� t�� ������t�������d 
activation is stopped and activation of the alterna�
tive response is initiated. Therefore, with respect to 
the priming phenomenon, the most crucial assump�
tion of this hypothesis is that only the new elements 
of the scene trigger the updating routine and start a 
possible correction of behavior.
Lleras  and  Enns’  (2004)  obj��t�u�d�t���  (O�) 
���ot����� ��� �u��o�t�d b� t�� fi�d��� t��t ����� 
composed  of  elements  irrelevant  to  the  task  (e.g. 
vertical and horizontal lines) lead to straight priming, 
while  inverse  priming  was  obtained  only  for  masks 
containing objects which shared features with the tar�
gets (����o���� & ��z��o������K����z��� 2005; Lleras 
& Enns, 2004; Verleger et al., 2004).
What is updated in the scene?
An important question to be asked is what exactly is 
updated in the scene when a mask appears. The answer 
seems easy in the case of Eimer and Schlaghecken’s 
o�������  �����  �o��o��d  o�  t�o  doub������o��. 
Indeed, in those experiments the mask replaced the 
prime. Therefore, the only new element added with 
the  presentation  of  the  mask  was  the  arrow  point�
��� �� t�� o��o��t� d����t�o�. Ho������ ����o���� ��d 
��z��o������K����z��  (2005)  demonstrated  inverse 
priming with masks which were formed from some ar�
rows randomly distributed over an area (Fig. 2). What 
�bout ����� u�d�t��� �� t��� ����? O�� ��� ���u�� 
that an object is more abstract than just a shape at a 
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Figure 2. 
Results of an experiment by Jaśkowski and Przekoracka-Kraw-
czyk (2005). The primes were double arrows presented at fixa-
tion. They were masked by four different masks shown in the 
middle row. The upper graph presents prime identifications for 
the four masks. Reaction time (RT) and proportion correct (PC) 
obtained in this experiment are presented in the lower graph.Straight and inverse priming
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given location. Therefore, it is conceivable that (i) the 
�������o���t�b�� ���t o� t�� ���� do�� �ot ���� �o� �� 
update even if the shapes presented in the masks shift 
their locations in respect to the prime or, even more, 
that (ii) participants’ motor behavior is updated only 
if stimuli assigned to different responses appear. With 
t��� �xt����o� o� t�� O� ���ot������ o�� ��� ������ 
�x����� ����o���� ��d ��z��o������K����z��’� (2005) 
inverse priming. Indeed, although there are some new 
arrows pointing in the same direction as the prime, 
one  can  assume  that  only  those  which  point  in  the 
other  direction  call  for  a  routine  which  corrects  the 
behavior (i.e. starts the alternative response and/or 
����b�t� t�� ������t�������d ����o���).
�o�� t��� ���� t��t ��� ���������� ���o�� t��t 
point in the same direction as the prime do not affect 
t�� ����o��� �t ���? A ������ �x�������t (����o���� 
& T�z��ń���� u��ub�����d ���u�t�) ��o��d�� �o�������� 
evidence that this is not true. Arrows were used as 
������ (F��. 3). T�� ����� ��� �o��o��d b� � ���� 
which was either the outline of a slightly larger ar�
row pointing in the same direction as the prime, or 
� ���t�����. T�� ����� �����d t�� ����� b� ��t��
contrast. Still larger arrows were used as targets. The 
arrow mask should not have called for the updating 
routine, not providing any new information on motor 
behavior. Therefore, the priming effect was expected 
to be the same for the arrow and rectangle masks. 
In fact, large straight priming was observed in the 
case of the arrow mask as if the activation induced 
by prime and mask summed up (for a similar effect 
see also ����o���� �t ��.� 2003). In the case of the 
rectangle mask, inverse priming was noted (Note 4). 
T�����o��� to ����t��� t�� O� ���ot������ o�� ��� 
to  assume  that  all  new  elements  are  updated,  but 
the  elements  pointing  in  the  other  direction  to  the 
prime are more important. In other words, in masks 
containing features of both primes to an equal extent, 
elements similar to the actually presented prime will 
be  less  salient,  therefore,  elements  similar  to  the 
opposite prime will act as a second prime in the op�
posite direction. 
Ex�������t� u���� ���do������ ������ ��d ���o�� 
as primes and targets have been interpreted as sup�
�o�t��� t�� O� ���ot������ but ���� �� ���t ���o���u�
����. T�� ����o� �� t��t �t �� u������ ���t��� ���do��
line masks are relevant or not in the context of arrow 
primes  and  targets.  Likewise,  it  is  unclear  whether 
���do������  �����  ���  o�  ���  �ot  �������  to  ���o� 
������ ��d t����t�. O� t�� o�� ���d� ��o�o���t� o� 
t�� O� ���ot����� �o���d���d ���do������ ����� �� 
being relevant and as being similar to arrow primes 
and targets (Lleras & Enns, 2004). Because of this task 
relevance of the masks, an object updating would be 
required in the case when an arrow prime preceded a 
���do������ ����. T�u�� t�� ob�����d ������� ������� 
�����t u�d�� ���do������ ���� �o�d�t�o�� ��� �o���d�
���d to �u��o�t t�� O� ���ot�����. 
O� t�� ot��� ���d� �o������ ��o�o���t� o� t�� SI 
���ot�����  �o���d���d  ���do������  �����  ��  b���� 
t�������������t ��d d��������� to t�� ����� ��d t����t 
arrows, meaning that the inverse priming effect under 
���do������ ���� �o�d�t�o�� ��o��d�d ���d���� �o� �� 
independence of inverse priming from task relevance of 
the masks (or for an independence of inverse priming 
from similarity between masks and prime or target). 
Evidently, this alternative interpretation of the results 
would be in stark contrast with the predictions of the 
O� ���ot�����. A� t���� �� �o ��d����d��t ���d���� to 
d���d� ���t��� ���do������ ����� ��� �������t o� �ot 
(and whether they are similar or not to the prime and 
target  arrows),  the  inverse  priming  effect  with  ran�
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Results of an unpublished experiment (Jaśkowski & Trzcińska, 
unpublished  results).  An  arrow  prime  presented  at  fixation 
was followed by a mask being an outline of a rectangle or of 
an arrow. The targets were still larger arrows. Priming effect  
[=  RT(incompatible)  –  RT(compatible)]  as  a  function  of  the 
prime-target interval is presented in the graph.188
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do������ ����� ����ot b� �o���d���d �� ���d���� �o� 
o� ������t t�� O� ���ot�����.
THE ROLE OF TASK-RELEVANT 
FEATURES IN THE MASK
T�� O� ���ot����� do�� �ot �x����� ���t����� o� ���
verse priming by arrow primes when the mask contains 
vertical and horizontal lines only (Klapp & Haas, 2005; 
Lleras  &  Enns,  2004;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2006; 
Schlaghecken  et  al.,  this  volume;  Verleger,  Görgen, 
&  ����o�����  2005),  inverse  priming  of  bar  primes 
masked by arrow masks (Verleger et al., 2005), nor 
inverse priming of square vs. diamond primes in Eimer 
(1999),  where  the  octagonal  mask  lay  inside  each 
prime, its corners rotated by 22.5° with respect to the 
corners  of  either  prime.  These  instances  of  inverse 
priming require an alternative explanation, preferably 
one that covers all instances of inverse priming.
Therefore, we proposed an alternative hypothesis 
�����d  “�����t�������d  ����b�t�o�”  (����o�����  2007; 
����o����  &  ��z��o������K����z���  2005)  that  may 
be  considered  as  a  synthesis  of  both  the  discussed 
hypotheses. First, in contrast to Verleger et al. (2004) 
and V�������� E����� ��d ����o���� (submitted), we 
concede that inhibition of the primed response does 
occur.  The  main  difference  from  Schlaghecken  and 
Eimer’s view (Bowman et al., 2006; Schlaghecken & 
Eimer, 2002, 2006) is that this inhibition is considered 
to be evoked by the mask rather than being a rigid 
consequence of prime activation occluded from further 
������tu�� ���d����. Mo�� �����fi������ �� ���u�� t��t 
each immediately following stimulus appearing within 
the  focus  of  attention,  which  does  not  support  the 
perceptual hypothesis concerning the prime’s identity 
(Note 5), will inhibit the ongoing action and thereby 
activate the alternative response (Note 6). However, 
the mask produces this  inhibition particularly if and 
insofar as it contains elements similar to the primes: 
Perception of any such elements informs the system 
that activation was premature and should be inhibited. 
T��� ���u��t�o� �� ���t��� ���� ��o� t�� O� ���ot��
���� t��� �t ��� ������ �t fi��t ����t: E�����t� o� t�� 
mask are actually not needed in the present hypoth�
esis  for  substituting  the  prime  by  a  mask  (working 
virtually as a new prime), but rather are assumed to 
��t �����t�d b� to��do�� �o�t�o� b���u�� ob������� 
����ot ���o�� t�����������t ������t�� ��d t�����o�� 
lead to inhibition of any activation.
I� o�� o� ����o����’� (2007) recent experiments, 
t�� ������ ���� ����� ������t�d �bo�� ��d b��o� fix�
�t�o� ��d t�� “����” �t fix�t�o�� but t�� ���� d�d �ot 
consist of diagonal lines anymore, rather it looked like a 
��o�� ��d � �qu���. T��� �����t ������ ��o� t�� �bo���
mentioned critical experiment (see Fig. 1) where the 
o������d������ �o��������� “����” ��� u��d� �bo��
ished inverse priming (there was straight priming with 
��� SOA�� �t ����t u� to +20 ��)� �� ��������t ��t� 
the proposal that the mask produces inhibition par�
ticularly if it contains elements similar to the primes. 
N����t������� ���� t��� ���������t ���� �od�fi�d �����
��� �����t�� d����d��� o� t�� ���������� ��d �����
t����t SOA�. T��� fi�d��� �� ���o����t��t ��t� ���d���
t�o�� o� t�� SI ��d O� ���ot����� �� (�) t�� “����” 
��t�d �� � fl����� ��t��� t��� � ����� t�����o��� t�� 
changes in the priming effect cannot be assigned to 
removing the sensory evidence by the mask as the 
SI ���ot����� ���u���; (��) t�� fl�����/“����” ��� �o 
relevant features which call for the updating routine, 
�� ���o�t��t ���u��t�o� o� t�� O� ���ot�����.
According to this view, spatial and temporal conditions 
affecting the perception of the mask are no less impor�
tant for inverse priming to occur than they are in their ef�
fect on the primes. Thus, presenting the prime and mask 
�t fix�t�o� �� � ���o��b�� �o�d�t�o� �o� ������� ������� 
(Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 
2002), possibly not only because the primes are more 
�oo��� ��������d �� t�� ��������� t��� �t fix�t�o�� but 
also because the same is true for the masks, which when 
presented in the periphery, the perceptual system is not 
confronted as intensively with interfering mask elements 
�� �t �� ���� t�� ���� �� ������t�d �t fix�t�o� o� ��t� 
larger size (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). 
Thus, we propose that the mask acts as a “false friend” 
to the processing system. It is a friend by preventing the 
system from misperceiving the primes as targets. But 
it is a false friend by presenting features that might be 
misunderstood by the system as being relevant. As a 
������u��d ������t t��� ��t���������� �x��t��� ����o��� 
activations get inhibited, putting them at a disadvantage 
for the upcoming response to the target.
T���� fi�d���� ���o �o���d Lleras and Enns (2006) to 
������ t���� O� ���ot�����. I� t��t �����t ��t����� t�� 
O� ���ot����� ��� �u�������t�d ��t� t�o �dd�t�o��� 
���u��t�o��� o�� o� ����� ��� ���� ��o�� to ou� �����
triggered inhibition. The only difference is that they 
d�d �ot ���u�� t��t ��������tu�� ��������� �� �u�� �� 
important. Instead, they maintain that it is important 
if new elements of the scene call for updating.
The second assumption they added was called the 
repeated location advantage. It refers to the observa�
tion that inverse priming is more likely when the prime 
and target are presented at the same or some nearby 
location. Lleras and Enns (2005) showed that when Straight and inverse priming
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the  prime  and  target  were  presented  at  the  same 
position, inverse priming occurred also for irrelevant 
masks (consisting of vertical and horizontal lines). In 
contrast, when only the prime and mask were present�
ed at the same position, while the target was displayed 
aside, inverse priming occurred only for the relevant 
mask. Lleras and Enns (2006) argued that the visual 
system considers a spatiotemporally proximal prime 
and  target  as  two  instantiations  of  a  single  object 
which changes/develops in time.
To �u�t��� �u��o�t t��� ��� �����o� o� t�� O� ���
�ot����� (�� ���� ����� to �t �� O�+) t��� ����o���d �� 
experiment where the basic predictions of the hypoth�
esis were tested. Several conditions were compared. 
The  prime  (double  arrow)  was  always  presented  at 
fix�t�o�. T�� t����t (doub�� ���o�) ��� ������t�d ���
t��� o� fix�t�o� (�.�. �t fix�t�o�) o� o�� fix�t�o� (�.�. ���
t��� �bo�� o� b��o� fix�t�o�). Mo��o���� t�� �o�d�t�o�� 
differed as to where the mask (overlaid double arrow 
or randomly distributed vertical and horizontal lines) 
��� �����d. I� t�� fl����d ���� �o�d�t�o� t�� ���� 
��� d�������d �t fix�t�o�� �o������ t�� ������ �� t�� 
fl����d fl������ �o�d�t�o�� t�o �d��t���� ����� ���� 
������t�d  ��  fl������  ���t  ��d  ����t  o�  fix�t�o��  ��d 
�� t�� �o�t��uou� fl������ �o�d�t�o�� t�� t�o fl������ 
remained on the screen until participants responded. 
�o����t��t  ��t�  t��  O�+  ���ot������  �����/t����t/
���� ��������t�� �b�u�t o���t o� fl������� ��d “���t��� 
similarity”, that is, the proximity of the presented ob�
jects, made the priming effect more negative.
T��  O�  ���ot�����  (����  t��  ot���  t�o)  d����o�� 
“by budding”: once a problem is encountered, a new 
assumption is added. At the same time, no clear evi�
dence has been provided that enhancement of inverse 
priming with relevant masks is due to object updating. 
Above we argued that the MTI hypothesis provides an 
alternative explanation. 
OCCURRENCE OF INVERSE  
PRIMING WITH STIMULI OTHER 
THAN ARROWS
T�� ��jo��t� o� �tud��� �������d �o ��� u��d ���o�����d 
lines as primes and targets. Thus, the question arises as 
to how much inverse priming actually occurs with other 
stimuli. In fact, inverse priming has been obtained with 
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Figure 3. 
Results of two experiments by Jaśkowski and Ślósarek (2007) with primes of different shapes. Priming effect [= RT(incompatible) 
– RT(compatible)] is plotted as a function of the prime-target interval. The shapes of the primes used are shown near each plot. In the 
experiment whose results are presented in the left graph, the masks were formed from lines of different orientation and length, randomly 
dispersed over an area. The mask used in the other experiment was formed from the two primes of a given pair overlaid with one an-
other. Note that overlaying the two pairs of the primes forms the identical mask.190
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a  number  of  different  stimuli:  inverted  arrows  (Eimer 
& Schlaghecken, 1998), squares vs. diamonds (Eimer, 
1999; Mattler, 2005), and “bars” (Verleger et al., 2005). 
Directly  comparing  arrows  to  letters  (H  and  S,  which 
are  the  standard  stimuli  applied  in  many  studies  on 
t�� ��t�������� �����t o� fl������ �t��u��)� V������� �t ��. 
(submitted) obtained inverse priming with arrows only. 
They did obtain a differential effect of masks on letter 
priming, very similar to the effect they obtained with ar�
�o��: ������� ��� ���� �t�����t ��t� t�� o������d������� 
t��� ��t� t�� ���do������ ����. But t�� �����t �������d 
in the positive range. Another interesting result was ob�
tained by Verleger et al. (2005): When masked by their 
o������d������� ����� “b���” (� �o��zo�t�� ���� ��t� � 
����o�����������t ���t���� ���� �t �t� ���t o� ����t ��d�) 
tended  to  have  a  straight  priming  effect.  It  was  only 
when they were masked by overlaid arrows that inverse 
priming occurred. To account for these two unclear ef�
fects, Verleger et al. (submitted) presumed that arrows 
are special in evoking inverse priming, possibly related 
to t���� �t�o���� ��t�������� �����t� �� ���������t fl����
ers  (Mattler,  2003;  Wascher,  Reinhard,  Wauschkuhn, 
&  Verleger,  1999),  and  to  their  potency  to  activate 
�����oto�  �o�t�x  b�  d���u�t  (Praamstra,  Boutsen,  & 
Humphreys,  2005;  Verleger,  Vollmer,  Wauschkuhn,  & 
Wascher, 2000). To �����t���t� t���� ��tt���� ����o���� 
��d Ś�ó����� (2007) compared the priming effects of dif�
ferent shapes as primes and targets, holding the mask 
�o��t��t (���do������� ����). I� ��������t ��t� t�� 
presumed special role of arrows, inverse priming evoked 
by arrows was larger than by brackets and by diamond 
��. �qu��� (F��. 4� u���� �����). Ho������ ����o���� ��d 
Ś�ó����� ����o��d t��t t�� d������� ���to� ����t ����� 
b� t�� ���������� ��t����t�o� (�.�. t�� ���� ��t� ����� 
the prime and target features could be singled out in 
the mask structure). In support of this assumption, dia�
mond vs. cross, which stimuli can be singled out with 
����  ��o�  ��  o������d����o��  ����  but  �����  ������� 
do not possess any overlearned directional feature, had 
a strong inverse priming effect, no less than arrows at   
100 �� �����t����t SOA (t�ou�� ���� �t �o���� SOA�; 
see Fig. 4 lower panel). In conclusion, while some aspects 
of differences in priming effects between stimuli are still 
unclear, some of these effects may be accounted for by 
t�� ���������� ��t����t�o�� t�u� b� t�� ���� ���to� t��t 
was considered to be relevant above in discussing the 
variation of inverse priming induced by different masks.
Notes
1 Note that unlike contemporary demonstrations of the 
priming  effect,  Fehrer  and  Raab  have  used  masked 
targets rather than masked primes.
2 It seems that an additional necessary assumption is 
t��t  u�d��  �o���������  but  �ot  b������d  ������� 
conditions, perceptual evidence for primes continues in 
��o��� ���o��. Ot�������� � ���o��� o� t�� ����� �o���
cides with the end of that stimulus and inverse priming 
��ou�d ������ ���o u�d�� �o��������� �o�d�t�o��.
3 Unlike Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998), Klapp and 
Hinkley  (2002)  used  a  mask  composed  of  letters: 
WXXW and XWWX. Still, one may speculate that they 
�o�t����d  t��  �������d��o�  ���tu���  (���o��).  Bot� 
these letters (especially X) might be perceived as a 
compound of two opposing arrows.
4  This  experiment  was  motivated  by  an  experiment 
reported recently by Dirk Vorberg (2005). Unlike our 
experiment, he used a mask that was a rectangle with 
�� ���o������ �ut�out. T��� �ut�out ��t���d �x��t�� to 
the priming arrow. 
5 Without this assumption it is impossible to account 
�o�  ����o����  ��d  T�z��ń���’�  �x�������t  d�����b�d 
�bo�� ��t��� t�� MTI ���ot�����. So� t��� �� � �o�t�
hoc assumption which was not presented in the previ�
ous formulations of the hypothesis (����o����� 2007; 
����o���� & ��z��o������K����z��� 2005). 
6 Results of numerous recent studies (Burle, Bonnet, 
Vidal,  Possamai,  &  Hasbroucq,  2002;  Praamstra  & 
Seiss, 2005; Vidal, Grapperon, Bonnet, & Hasbroucq, 
2003) demonstrate that in choice tasks, activation of a 
response is associated with inhibition of the alternative 
response.
References
Abrams, R. L., & Greenwald, A. G. (2000). Parts out�
weigh the whole (word) in unconscious analysis of 
meaning. Psychological Science, 11� 118�124.
A��o����  �.�  K�otz�  W.�  &  N�u�����  O.  (1998). 
Manual and verbal responses to completely masked 
(unreportable) stimuli: Exploring some conditions 
for the metacontrast dissociation. Perception, 27, 
1177�1189.
A��o���� �.� & N�u����� O. (2005). Intentions de�
t������ t�� �����t o� ������b�� ��t��o�t���t������d 
������: ���d���� �o� to��do�� �o�t��������� �� � 
peripheral  cuing  task.  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology:  Human  Perception  and  Performance, 
31� 762�777.
Bartlett, N. R., & MacLeod, S. (1954). E����t o� fl��� 
��d  fi��d  �u�������  u�o�  �u���  ����t�o�  t���. 
Journal  of  Optical  Society  of  America,  44�  306�
311.
Bowman, H., Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (2006). A 
neural network model of inhibitory processes and 
cognitive control. Visual Cognition, 13� 401�480.Straight and inverse priming
191
http://www.ac-psych.org
Breitmeyer, B. G. (1984). Visual masking: An integra-
tive approach. Ox�o�d� N�� Yo��: ������do� �����/
Ox�o�d ��������t� �����. 
B���t������ B. G.� Öğ���� H.� R��o�� �.� & ����� �. 
(2005). Unconscious and conscious priming by forms 
and their parts. Visual Cognition, 12� 720�736.
Breitmeyer,  B.  G.,  Ro,  T.,  &  Singhal,  N.  S.  (2004). 
Unconscious  color  priming  occurs  at  stimu�
�u��  �ot  ������t�d����d��t  ������  o�  ��o�������. 
Psychological Science, 15� 198�202.
Bu����  B.�  Bo���t�  M.�  V�d���  F.�  �o�������  �.�A.�  & 
Hasbroucq, T. (2002). A transcranial magnetic stimu�
lation  study  of  information  processing  in  the  motor 
cortex: Relationship between the silent period and the 
reaction  time  delay.  Psychophysiology,  39�  207�217.
Dehaene,  S.,  Naccache,  L.,  Cohen,  L.,  Le  Bihan,  D., 
M������ �.�F.� �o����� �.�B.� & R���é��� �. (2001). Cerebral 
mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repeti�
tion priming. Nature Neuroscience, 4� 752�758.
Di  Lollo,  V.,  &  Enns,  J.  T.  (2000).  Competition  for 
consciousness  among  visual  events:  The  psycho�
physics  of  reentrant  visual  processes.  Journal  of 
Experimental  Psychology:  General,  129�  481�501.
Draine, S. C., & Greenwald, A. G. (1998). Replicable un�
conscious semantic priming. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 127� 286�303.
Eimer,  M.  (1999).  Facilitatory  and  inhibitory  effects 
of  masked  prime  stimuli  on  motor  activation  and 
behavioural  performance.  Acta  Psychologica,  101, 
293�313.
Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (1998). Effects of masked 
stimuli  on  motor  activation:  Behavioral  and  elec�
trophysiological evidence.  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology:  Human  Perception  and  Performance, 
24� 1737�1747.
Eimer,  M.,  &  Schlaghecken,  F.  (2002).  Links  be�
tween  conscious  awareness  and  response  inhibi�
tion: Evidence from masked priming. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 9� 514�520.
Fehrer, E., & Raab, D. (1962). Reaction time to stimuli 
masked by metacontrast. Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology, 63� 143�147.
Fellows,  S.,  Tabaza,  R.,  Heumann,  M.,  Klotz,  W., 
N�u����� O.� S�����z� M.� Not�� �.� & Tö����� R. 
(2002). Mod�fi��t�o� o� � �u��t�o��� �oto� t��� b� �ot 
consciously perceived sensory stimuli. NeuroReport, 
13� 637�640.
J���o�����  �.  (1985).  The  effect  of  visual  adapta�
tion on simple motor reaction time. Part I. Studia 
Psychologica, 27� 191�201.
J���o����� �. (2007). The effect of nonmasking dis�
tractors on the priming of motor responses. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 33� 456�468.
J���o����� �.� B��łuń���� A.� To������ M.� & V�������� 
R. (in press). M���� ��d d��t���to��t�������d ����b��
tory processes in the priming of motor responses. 
An EEG study. Psychophysiology.
J���o�����  �.�  &  ��z��o������K����z���  A.  (2005). 
O� t�� �o�� o� ���� �t�u�tu�� �� �ub������� �������. 
Acta  Neurobiologiae  Experimentalis,  65�  409�417.
J���o����� �.� S������� B.� & V�������� R. (2003). How 
the self controls its “automatic pilot” when process�
ing  subliminal  information.  Journal  of  Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 15� 911�920.
J���o����� �.� & Ś�ó������ M. (2007). How important is 
prime’s gestalt for subliminal priming? Consciousness 
and Cognition, 16� 485�497.
J���o����� �.� ��� d�� Lubb�� R.� S���ott��b���� E.� & 
Verleger, R. (2002). Traces left on visual selective 
attention by stimuli that are not consciously identi�
fi�d. Psychological Science, 13� 48�54.
Kiefer, M., & Spitzer, M. (2000). Time course of con�
scious  and  unconscoius  semantic  brain  activation. 
NeuroReport, 11� 2401�2407.
Kiesel,  A.,  Kunde,  W.,  &  Hoffmann,  J.  (2007).  Mechanisms 
of subliminal response priming. Advances in Cognitive 
Psychology, 3� 307�315. 
Klapp,  S.  T.,  &  Haas,  B.  W.  (2005).  Nonconscious 
��flu���� o� �����d �t��u�� o� ����o��� �����t�o� 
��  ����t�d  to  �o����t�  �t��u�u������o���  ���o����
tions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 31� 173�209.
Klapp,  S.  T.,  &  Hinkley,  L.  B.  (2002).  The  negative 
�o���t�b���t�  �����t:  ���o����ou�  ����b�t�o�  ��flu�
ences reaction time and response selection. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 131� 255�269.
K�otz�  W.�  &  N�u�����  O.  (1999).  Motor  activation 
without  conscious  discrimination  in  metacontrast 
masking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 25� 976�992.
Klotz, W., & Wolff, P. (1995). The effect of a masked 
stimulus on the response to the masking stimulus. 
Psychological Research, 58� 92�101.
Ku�d�� W.� K������ A.� & Ho������� �. (2003). Conscious 
control over the content of unconscious cognition. 
Cognition, 88� 223�242.
Leuthold, H., & Kopp, B. (1998). Mechanisms of prim�
��� b� �����d �t��u��: I��������� ��o� ����t����
lated  brain  potentials.  Psychological  Science,  9, 192
http://www.ac-psych.org
Piotr Jaśkowski and Rolf Verleger
263�269.
Lingnau, A., & Vorberg, D. (2005). The time course of 
response inhibition in masked priming. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 67� 545�557.
Lleras,  A.,  &  Enns,  J.  T.  (2004).  N���t���  �o���� 
tibility  or  object  updating?  A  cautionary  tale  of 
�����d����d��t  �������.  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology: General, 133� 475�493.
Lleras, A., & Enns, J. T. (2005). Updating a cautionary tale 
of masked priming: A reply to Klapp (2005). Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 134� 436�440.
Lleras, A., & Enns, J. T. (2006). How much like a target 
can a mask be? Geometric, spatial, and temporal 
similarity in priming. A reply to Schlaghecken and 
Eimer (2006). Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 135� 495�500.
M���fi��d� R. �. W. (1973). Latency function in human 
vision. Vision Research, 13� 2219�2234.
M�tt���� �. (2003). Priming of mental operation by masked 
stimuli. Perception & Psychophysics, 65� 167�187.
Mattler, U. (2005). Inhibition and decay of motor and 
nonmotor priming. Perception & Psychophysics, 67, 
285�300.
N�u�����  O.  (1990).  �����t  ������t��  �����fi���
tion  and  the  concept  of  perception.  Psychological 
Research, 52� 207�215.
N�u����� O.� & K�otz� W. (1994). Motor responses to 
nonreportable, masked stimuli: Where is the limit 
o�  d����t  ������t��  �����fi��t�o�?  I�  �.  ����tá  & 
M.  Moscovitch  (Eds.),  Conscious  and  unconscious 
information processing (��. 123�150). ���b��d��� 
MA: MIT Press.
Praamstra, P., Boutsen, L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2005). 
Frontoparietal control of spatial attention and motor 
intention in human EEG. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
94� 764�774.
Praamstra, P., & Seiss, E. (2005). The neurophysiol�
ogy of response competition: Motor cortex activa�
tion  and  inhibition  following  subliminal  response 
priming.  Journal  of  Cognitive  Neuroscience,  17, 
483�493.
Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (2000). A ���t�������
ripheral asymmetry in masked priming. Perception 
& Psychophysics, 62� 1367�1382.
Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (2002). Motor activa�
tion  with  and  without  inhibition:  Evidence  for  a 
threshold mechanism in motor control. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 64� 148�162.
Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (2006). Active masks 
and active inhibition: A comment on Lleras and Enns 
(2004) ��d o� V�������� ����o����� A�d����� ��� d�� 
Lubbe, and Groen (2004). Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 135� 484�494.
Schlaghecken,  F.,  Rowley,  L.,  Sembi,  S.,  Simmons, 
R., & Whitcomb, D. (2007). The negative compat�
�b���t� �����t: A ���� �o� ���������b�t�o�. Advances in 
Cognitive Psychology, 3� 227�240.
Sumner,  P.  (2007).  N���t���  ��d  �o��t���  �����d�
priming – implications for motor inhibition. Advances 
in Cognitive Psychology, 3� 275�287.
V�������� R.� E����� T.� & ����o����� �. (�ub��tt�d). O� 
t�� ������� �o�� o� ���o�������d ���o�� �� fl������: 
Inverse priming depends on types of stimuli and of 
masks.
V��������  R.�  Gö�����  S.�  &  ����o�����  �.  (2005).   
An  ERP  indicator  of  processing  relevant  gestalts   
in masked priming. Psychophysiology, 41� 677�690.
V�������� R.� ����o����� �.� A�d����� A.� V�� d�� Lubb�� 
R. H. J., & Groen, M. (2004). Qualitative differences 
b�t���� �o����ou� ��d �o���o����ou� ��o�������? 
O� ����t��� ��d �o��t��� ������� �����t� ��du��d b� 
masked arrows. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133� 494�515.
Verleger, R., Vollmer, C., Wauschkuhn, B., & Wascher, 
E. (2000). Dimensional overlap between arrows as 
�u���� �t��u�� ��d ����o����? E��d���� ��o� �o�t���
ipsilateral  differences  in  EEG  potentials.  Cognitive 
Brain Research, 10� 99�109.
Vidal, F., Grapperon, J., Bonnet, M., & Hasbroucq, T. 
(2003). The nature of unilateral motor commands in 
b�t��������d ��o��� t���� �� �������d b� �u����� 
Laplacian  estimation.  Psychophysiology,  40�  796�
805.
Vorberg, D. (2005, April). Ist Hemung oder Bahnung 
die  Grundlage  des  umgekehrten  Priming-Effekte? 
[Does inhibition or facilitation underlie the inverse 
�������  �����t?].  �����  ������t�d  �t  t��  47t� 
Congress of Experimental Psychology. Regensburg, 
Germany.
Wascher, E., Reinhard, M., Wauschkuhn, B., & Verleger, 
R.  (1999).  S��t���  S�R  �o���t�b�t�  ��t�  ���t����� 
������t�d  �t��u��:  A�  ����t�����t�d  ������t�� 
study on dimensional overlap. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 11� 214�229.